lubna
18-09-2005, 01:13
Who
labels who? A reply to Ehsan Masood
Abdullah al-Kateb
13 - 9 - 2005
The differences among British Muslims should not be aligned with the events of 7
July in London. Both the BBC’s John Ware and Ehsan Masood in openDemocracy have
got the community wrong, says Abdullah al-Kateb.
Ehsan Masood argues in his openDemocracy article “British Muslims must stop the
war” that “Sunni Islam” can be split in “two of the broadest divisions”, which
“can loosely be termed ‘Sufi’ (often referred to as ‘Traditional Islam’) and
‘non-Sufi’ (often called ‘Revivalist Islam’).”
Abdullah al-Kateb is replying to:
Ehsan Masood’s article on openDemocracy, “British Muslims must stop the war”
(August 2005)
John Ware’s BBC Panorama documentary, “A Question of Leadership” (21 August
2005)
In my opinion, such a classification is deeply flawed, for two reasons: because
there is no such thing as “Sufi Islam” and because there is no real dichotomy
between the so-called “traditionalist” and the “revivalist”. The reality is far
more complex.
The myth of Sufi Islam
Tasawuf – or following the path of Islamic spirituality – is not a theological
or Islamic school of law. It is a path more akin to moral ethics: in other
words, how do I approach others and how do I view myself? It is not a school nor
can it ever be described as a school. For a school or trend to exist, there is
usually a common group of ideas either in theology or in the technicalities of
Islamic law. Hence we have four major Sunni schools of law and two major Sunni
theological schools. However, Sufis do not necessarily follow one monolithic
school of law or even adopt one theological viewpoint. A Sufi can be a Sunni or
even a Shi’a.
For example, Ayatollah Khomeini taught the works of Ibn-Arabi in his classes,
who was by no means a Shi’a. Khomeini lectured on Ibn-Arabi as a master in moral
ethics and spirituality. The doctrinal differences that might have existed
between Khomeini and Ibn-Arabi did not prevent him from using such works as they
were irrelevant to the subject of tasawuf.
Furthermore, Sufis can have extreme doctrinal differences. Some Sufis have
verged on anthropomorphism while others have been pantheists. John Ware, in his
BBC Panorama programme “A Question of Leadership” that occasioned Ehsan Masood’s
article, claims that most British Muslims follow the Sufi version of Islam; in
saying this he exposes his deep ignorance about what Sufis (and Islam for that
matter) actually are.
Those who do follow a Sufi tariqa (path) are not necessarily apolitical. Some
medieval Sufis, such as Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), wrote tracts on the
political issues of their day. The late Syrian sheikh and modern Sufi, Abdul
Fattah Abu-Ghuddah, was one of the main leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria. Others, such as Imam Shamil (1797-1871), led a long war of resistance
against the Russian occupation of the Caucasus.
A false dichotomy
Ehsan Masood’s second faulty point is the polarisation between “traditionalist”
Sufis and political “revivalists”. But if Sufis are considered
“traditionalists”, the question follows: what exactly is “traditional Islam”? If
it is following one of the traditional schools of law then a great many of what
Ehsan calls “revivalist” movements do precisely that. If it is following one of
the classical schools of theology then again most Islamists do. Again it is not
clear what Ehsan means by “traditional Islam”. Furthermore, many members of
revivalist Islamic movements were actually followers of different Sufi tariqa.
I disagree with Ehsan when he says:
“one of the more worrying aspects of the (Muslim Council of Britain) is that its
more influential affiliates all have theological roots in anti-Sufi Islamism,
drawing inspiration from people – such as the Pakistani Islamist Abul A’la
Maududi or Egypt’s Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood – who
actively campaigned against what for their part they saw as Sufi
authoritarianism.”
Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, historically did
not have a eeply antagonistic view towards Sufi tariqa. On the contrary Hasan
al-Banna was himself initiated into the Husafiya Sufi Tariqa and condemned
sectarian divisions between Muslims. It is true he was deeply influenced by the
ideas of the Syrian scholar Rashid Rida (1865-1935), but the latter’s ideas were
not akin to the anti-Sufi Wahhabi movement that exists in Saudi Arabia today.
True, Rashid Rida shared with the Wahhabi some thoughts relating to the schools
of Islamic law, but he differed greatly from them on broader theological issues.
Rida was a student of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), whose
theological views were far from those of the Saudi Wahhabi or Sunni theological
schools. Muhammad Abduh’s own views were singular; his opinions about miracles,
for example, were highly controversial amongst the scholars of his day.
Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh (especially their ideas on revivalism) had some
influence on Hassan al-Banna, but not all their personal views found favour with
him. The rift between Muhammad Abduh / Rashid Rida and the Sufis may have led
Ehsan Masood to view Hassan al-Banna as a mere extension of these men, drawing
the conclusion that he too was hostile to Sufis. This is incorrect.
What kind of war?
Ehsan concludes:
“Panorama’s John Ware correctly identified a war being fought at the heart of
British Islam. The problem – if you agree that there is one – is not just in the
evidence it collected, but that the reporter seems to be firing some of the
ammunition collected and supplied by one side for use against the other.”
Is there a war at the heart of British Islam? Yes, there are differences amongst
various Muslim groups, differences that existed long before the events of 7 July
2005. But personally, I find the argument that the finer points of eschatology,
ritual religious practice or the functions of an Islamic state have anything to
do with these events unconvincing. Most of these theological issues are decades
(and sometimes centuries) old; they arose long before the modern phenomenon of
terrorism. The real question is: why are such issues being hashed together as if
they were directly related to the London attacks?
Also in openDemocracy on British Muslims’ problems, concerns and divisions:
Mohammed Sajid, “The gap between us”
Maruf Khwaja, “Muslims in Britain: generations, experiences, futures”
“What happened? What changed? What now?” – a transcript of the 21 July meeting
in London co – hosted by openDemocracy and Q – News
Abdul Wahid, “Hizb – ut – Tahrir’s distinction”
If you find this material valuable please consider supporting openDemocracy by
sending us a donation so that we can continue our work and keep it free for all
Panorama did not address most of these controversial issues in the context of
scripture or theology but instead implied that certain views actually lead to
extremism and that 7 July is their natural consequence. The programme later
describes what “extremists” and “moderates” are all about. The question that
Ehsan Masood fails to answer is whether these supposed warring factions of
“Sufis” and “revivalists” actually view their differences in this context?
Moreover, do Ehsan’s neatly-defined warring factions differ significantly on the
issues highlighted by the documentary? If so, which ones?
Ehsan remarks: “Most viewers would see the result, the Panorama documentary, as
representing impartial journalism not partisan activism.” But how can the
Panorama documentary really be impartial if it defines beforehand the scope of
debate? Before the programme set out to investigate the level of extremism
amongst Muslims in Britain, it had already defined both “extremism” and
“moderation”.
I would not deny that there are differences amongst British Muslims. However,
many of these differences do not warrant the kind of broad, general
categorisations that Ehsan proposes. I am not against categorisation per se;
categories exist in every community of people. But for a categorisation to be
useful in a sociological study, it must be accurate and suitably specific to
define a group.
What, then, are the categories useful to characterise British Muslims? The
answer depends on the particular issue being discussed. Some differences relate
to theology, others to law; some groups that differ with each other on one point
may find common ground on another. The process of understanding sects and groups
can be painstaking, and many journalists are unable or unwilling to undergo it.
John Ware’s Panorama is illuminating in this respect.
A final point on the question of labels: I do not find them useful, as they lack
objectivity in defining viewpoints or people. Instead, they draw on preconceived
ideas to judge people. It is unfortunate that hyperbole, scaremongering and
labelling of journalists and politicians can stigmatise whole communities. If a
finger is constantly pointed at any community, it is only natural for its
members to withdraw.
A healthy open discussion does not depend on the other side sharing or liking my
views; if that were the case, the very idea of discussion and dialogue would
become pointless. Labelling viewpoints or people leads precisely to this result.
The ideas put forward by Tony Blair about combating extremism and “evil
ideologies” are a euphemism for thought control. Instead of building positive
community relationships, such an approach reinforces a siege mentality amongst
the Muslim community and confirms the belief that dialogue is pointless.
source:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim_community_2828.jsp
Copyright © Abdullah al-Kateb, Published by openDemocracy Ltd. You may download
and print extracts from this article for your own personal and non-commercial
use only. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a
donation. Contact us if you wish to discuss republication. Some articles on this
site are published under different terms.
labels who? A reply to Ehsan Masood
Abdullah al-Kateb
13 - 9 - 2005
The differences among British Muslims should not be aligned with the events of 7
July in London. Both the BBC’s John Ware and Ehsan Masood in openDemocracy have
got the community wrong, says Abdullah al-Kateb.
Ehsan Masood argues in his openDemocracy article “British Muslims must stop the
war” that “Sunni Islam” can be split in “two of the broadest divisions”, which
“can loosely be termed ‘Sufi’ (often referred to as ‘Traditional Islam’) and
‘non-Sufi’ (often called ‘Revivalist Islam’).”
Abdullah al-Kateb is replying to:
Ehsan Masood’s article on openDemocracy, “British Muslims must stop the war”
(August 2005)
John Ware’s BBC Panorama documentary, “A Question of Leadership” (21 August
2005)
In my opinion, such a classification is deeply flawed, for two reasons: because
there is no such thing as “Sufi Islam” and because there is no real dichotomy
between the so-called “traditionalist” and the “revivalist”. The reality is far
more complex.
The myth of Sufi Islam
Tasawuf – or following the path of Islamic spirituality – is not a theological
or Islamic school of law. It is a path more akin to moral ethics: in other
words, how do I approach others and how do I view myself? It is not a school nor
can it ever be described as a school. For a school or trend to exist, there is
usually a common group of ideas either in theology or in the technicalities of
Islamic law. Hence we have four major Sunni schools of law and two major Sunni
theological schools. However, Sufis do not necessarily follow one monolithic
school of law or even adopt one theological viewpoint. A Sufi can be a Sunni or
even a Shi’a.
For example, Ayatollah Khomeini taught the works of Ibn-Arabi in his classes,
who was by no means a Shi’a. Khomeini lectured on Ibn-Arabi as a master in moral
ethics and spirituality. The doctrinal differences that might have existed
between Khomeini and Ibn-Arabi did not prevent him from using such works as they
were irrelevant to the subject of tasawuf.
Furthermore, Sufis can have extreme doctrinal differences. Some Sufis have
verged on anthropomorphism while others have been pantheists. John Ware, in his
BBC Panorama programme “A Question of Leadership” that occasioned Ehsan Masood’s
article, claims that most British Muslims follow the Sufi version of Islam; in
saying this he exposes his deep ignorance about what Sufis (and Islam for that
matter) actually are.
Those who do follow a Sufi tariqa (path) are not necessarily apolitical. Some
medieval Sufis, such as Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), wrote tracts on the
political issues of their day. The late Syrian sheikh and modern Sufi, Abdul
Fattah Abu-Ghuddah, was one of the main leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria. Others, such as Imam Shamil (1797-1871), led a long war of resistance
against the Russian occupation of the Caucasus.
A false dichotomy
Ehsan Masood’s second faulty point is the polarisation between “traditionalist”
Sufis and political “revivalists”. But if Sufis are considered
“traditionalists”, the question follows: what exactly is “traditional Islam”? If
it is following one of the traditional schools of law then a great many of what
Ehsan calls “revivalist” movements do precisely that. If it is following one of
the classical schools of theology then again most Islamists do. Again it is not
clear what Ehsan means by “traditional Islam”. Furthermore, many members of
revivalist Islamic movements were actually followers of different Sufi tariqa.
I disagree with Ehsan when he says:
“one of the more worrying aspects of the (Muslim Council of Britain) is that its
more influential affiliates all have theological roots in anti-Sufi Islamism,
drawing inspiration from people – such as the Pakistani Islamist Abul A’la
Maududi or Egypt’s Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood – who
actively campaigned against what for their part they saw as Sufi
authoritarianism.”
Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, historically did
not have a eeply antagonistic view towards Sufi tariqa. On the contrary Hasan
al-Banna was himself initiated into the Husafiya Sufi Tariqa and condemned
sectarian divisions between Muslims. It is true he was deeply influenced by the
ideas of the Syrian scholar Rashid Rida (1865-1935), but the latter’s ideas were
not akin to the anti-Sufi Wahhabi movement that exists in Saudi Arabia today.
True, Rashid Rida shared with the Wahhabi some thoughts relating to the schools
of Islamic law, but he differed greatly from them on broader theological issues.
Rida was a student of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), whose
theological views were far from those of the Saudi Wahhabi or Sunni theological
schools. Muhammad Abduh’s own views were singular; his opinions about miracles,
for example, were highly controversial amongst the scholars of his day.
Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh (especially their ideas on revivalism) had some
influence on Hassan al-Banna, but not all their personal views found favour with
him. The rift between Muhammad Abduh / Rashid Rida and the Sufis may have led
Ehsan Masood to view Hassan al-Banna as a mere extension of these men, drawing
the conclusion that he too was hostile to Sufis. This is incorrect.
What kind of war?
Ehsan concludes:
“Panorama’s John Ware correctly identified a war being fought at the heart of
British Islam. The problem – if you agree that there is one – is not just in the
evidence it collected, but that the reporter seems to be firing some of the
ammunition collected and supplied by one side for use against the other.”
Is there a war at the heart of British Islam? Yes, there are differences amongst
various Muslim groups, differences that existed long before the events of 7 July
2005. But personally, I find the argument that the finer points of eschatology,
ritual religious practice or the functions of an Islamic state have anything to
do with these events unconvincing. Most of these theological issues are decades
(and sometimes centuries) old; they arose long before the modern phenomenon of
terrorism. The real question is: why are such issues being hashed together as if
they were directly related to the London attacks?
Also in openDemocracy on British Muslims’ problems, concerns and divisions:
Mohammed Sajid, “The gap between us”
Maruf Khwaja, “Muslims in Britain: generations, experiences, futures”
“What happened? What changed? What now?” – a transcript of the 21 July meeting
in London co – hosted by openDemocracy and Q – News
Abdul Wahid, “Hizb – ut – Tahrir’s distinction”
If you find this material valuable please consider supporting openDemocracy by
sending us a donation so that we can continue our work and keep it free for all
Panorama did not address most of these controversial issues in the context of
scripture or theology but instead implied that certain views actually lead to
extremism and that 7 July is their natural consequence. The programme later
describes what “extremists” and “moderates” are all about. The question that
Ehsan Masood fails to answer is whether these supposed warring factions of
“Sufis” and “revivalists” actually view their differences in this context?
Moreover, do Ehsan’s neatly-defined warring factions differ significantly on the
issues highlighted by the documentary? If so, which ones?
Ehsan remarks: “Most viewers would see the result, the Panorama documentary, as
representing impartial journalism not partisan activism.” But how can the
Panorama documentary really be impartial if it defines beforehand the scope of
debate? Before the programme set out to investigate the level of extremism
amongst Muslims in Britain, it had already defined both “extremism” and
“moderation”.
I would not deny that there are differences amongst British Muslims. However,
many of these differences do not warrant the kind of broad, general
categorisations that Ehsan proposes. I am not against categorisation per se;
categories exist in every community of people. But for a categorisation to be
useful in a sociological study, it must be accurate and suitably specific to
define a group.
What, then, are the categories useful to characterise British Muslims? The
answer depends on the particular issue being discussed. Some differences relate
to theology, others to law; some groups that differ with each other on one point
may find common ground on another. The process of understanding sects and groups
can be painstaking, and many journalists are unable or unwilling to undergo it.
John Ware’s Panorama is illuminating in this respect.
A final point on the question of labels: I do not find them useful, as they lack
objectivity in defining viewpoints or people. Instead, they draw on preconceived
ideas to judge people. It is unfortunate that hyperbole, scaremongering and
labelling of journalists and politicians can stigmatise whole communities. If a
finger is constantly pointed at any community, it is only natural for its
members to withdraw.
A healthy open discussion does not depend on the other side sharing or liking my
views; if that were the case, the very idea of discussion and dialogue would
become pointless. Labelling viewpoints or people leads precisely to this result.
The ideas put forward by Tony Blair about combating extremism and “evil
ideologies” are a euphemism for thought control. Instead of building positive
community relationships, such an approach reinforces a siege mentality amongst
the Muslim community and confirms the belief that dialogue is pointless.
source:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim_community_2828.jsp
Copyright © Abdullah al-Kateb, Published by openDemocracy Ltd. You may download
and print extracts from this article for your own personal and non-commercial
use only. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a
donation. Contact us if you wish to discuss republication. Some articles on this
site are published under different terms.